The Forgotten Airwar: Airpower In The Mesopotamian Campaign by Major Peter J. Lambert

Author:Major Peter J. Lambert [Lambert, Major Peter J.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, World War I, Europe, Great Britain, General, Germany, Aviation
ISBN: 9781786256485
Google: 10dvCwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2015-11-06T05:06:21+00:00

CHAPTER 5—FROM DEFEAT TO VICTORY

Directions from London in April 1916 were explicit: remain in a defensive posture to keep the Turks engaged along the Tigris. This order reflected anticipation in the War Office of a Russian advance from northern Persia towards Baghdad. Moreover, London did not want to send the wrong signal to its Arab and Muslim subjects that it was willing to withdraw because of Turkish successes. Indeed, in a telegram from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London to the Commander-in-Chief of India, Sir Beauchamp Duff, the policy was very prescriptive, “At present our policy in Mesopotamia is defensive and we do not attach any importance to the possession of Kut or to the occupation of Baghdad.”{179}

Ordered to remain on the defensive, British forces reorganized and strengthened a previously disorganized and ill-equipped logistics system. RFC machines flew reconnaissance in May (now at Shaik Saad on the Tigris River—to the west of Kut) to determine current Turkish positions. Based on RFC observations, the new logistics effort was focused on overland transport vice river transport as the most effective. London wanted to ensure the Tigris Corps would have the necessary logistics for the future.

“Sir W. Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, fully realized that if forces under Sir Percy Lake [then commander of all British forces in Mesopotamia] were to retrieve the disaster that had occurred at Kut, means of transport of all kinds, whether by river, or in the form of railways, or in the matter of motor lorries and animals, must be provided on a generous scale.”{180}

Despite the optimism of ground commanders for a reinvigorated logistics system, General Gorringe reflected a gloomy opinion on the state of the RFC versus its Turkish-German opponent. Moberly captures Gorringe’s assessment:

“On 14th May, General Gorringe reported that the mastery of the air had passed into the hands of the enemy. His Fokker aeroplanes were of greater fighting efficiency than the British machines; and the British air personnel and machines were also feeling the strain of the work at high pressure which had preceded the surrender of Kut and which had come after months of continuous work without a rest. As a result, there were many casualties among the pilots from sickness and a large proportion of the aeroplanes were unfit to fly, while for various reasons the seaplanes were no longer of any use.”{181}

Gorringe wrote his dire report on the condition of the RFC in the hope that such a damning statement would prompt London to provide the Tigris Corps with better equipment and more personnel. Gorringe’s request was timely indeed. On 11 June, enemy aeroplanes became more aggressive in attacks beyond Kut. German machines directed Turkish artillery fire, destroying three British ammunition barges on the Tigris, to the west of Shaik Saad, followed by aerial bombardment of the British 13th Division later in the month.{182} Gorringe’s appeal would be realized, but not before the Tigris Corps underwent a major reorganization in structure and leadership.

Despite the defensive posture along

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